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Abstract
Technological advancements and the COVID-19 pandemic caused an increase in the
adoption of technologies, services, and computers. Public cloud services surged with a 17%
increase, and adoption of software services such as online video conferencing tools increased
for national and industrial actors. Subsequently, security became a crucial component due
to increased adoption, connectivity, and cybersecurity risks of services and systems. The
heightened interest from individuals, organizations and national actors in the security
domain is not without cause, as security breaches caused by malicious actors surged in
parallel. Security researchers and experts leverage their expertise to overcome threats by
malicious actors.
The side-channel domain is an active research topic for security experts. Side-channel
information is gathered from the involuntary leak of information from a system, which
can represent a vulnerability for corporations and individuals alike. Security researchers
and malicious actors have shown that they can use side-channel information to attack and
protect systems. For instance, a malicious actor can attack a system by extracting secrets
using side-channel information such as power consumption or electromagnetic emissions.
In contrast, protection of a system to help detect malware and attacks against a system is
also possible by using side-channels such as cache and power consumption.
Analyzing side-channel information is possible through different methodologies such as
machine learning. Studies have shown that machine-learning models process side-channel
information and help achieve the analysis goals with high accuracy and precision. However,
machine-learning algorithms require large datasets, and in this case, this means a large
number of samples from the used side-channels. The need for such datasets motivates this
thesis to discuss the challenges and an approach to collecting large datasets of side-channel
information from multiple systems.
The challenge of reliably capturing side-channel information for later analysis grows
with the number of assessed targets, the number of channels, the sampling rate, and the
resolution of each sample. Side-channel data acquisition relies on physical access to target
systems, making it challenging to collect data from several devices. Thus, to enable machine
learning models and a robust analysis process, side-channel data acquisition requires a
scalable, decentralized, and consistent approach to collect data. To solve the scalability
issue around collecting side-channel information from several systems, we propose a data
pipeline architecture to collect side-channel information that fulfills quality attributes such
as maintainability, reusability, reliability, and scalability.
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Computer systems are becoming more connected every day, and there is an increasing need
for cybersecurity solutions to secure these systems. For instance, cars now include systems
that enable autonomous driving and use navigation systems. Airplanes use Automatic De-
pendent Surveillance–Broadcast (ADS-B) systems and flight entertainment systems con-
nected to a network. Ships report their positioning through satellite communications and
provide the live status of their cargo. Power plants use advanced control systems that
connect them to federal and provincial grid management systems. As systems get more
connected, security risks also surge. Vulnerabilities can cause severe damage and incur
costs to infrastructure and people.
The MITRE Corporation introduced a standard dictionary to track vulnerabilities
called Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) [1]. Security threats caused by the
increase in connectivity are visible based on the expansion of CVE. Since 2016, CVE main-
tains a steady rise in vulnerabilities recorded [2]. Vulnerabilities such as CVE-2019-9977
allow malicious actors to alter the driving functions of a car [3]. CVE-2016-9361 can steer
a ship off course [4], and CVE-2019-9019 enables malicious actors to use a buffer overflow
to attack the entertainment system on Boeing 777-36N(ER) planes [5]. Each vulnerability
can incur a high cost to lives and infrastructure. Individuals, governments, and organiza-
tions increasingly spend resources replacing, renewing, and hardening existing systems to
mitigate the risks of cybersecurity issues [6].
Side-channel information leaks are another type of vulnerability that malicious actors
and experts leverage for attacking and defending systems. The cause of the vulnerability is
the involuntary information leak from a system. Analyzing side-channel information may
yield secrets and details about a system, and machine learning is one of the many possible
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approaches to analyzing side-channel information.
Side-channel information is rich data that lends itself to machine learning. Studies in-
dicate that machine learning models can extract patterns from data with high accuracy [7].
For example, Lerman et al. show that Random Forest models apply to side-channel infor-
mation with little context on a black-box setting [8]. Similarly, Benadjila et al. describe
that transforming template attacks to a machine learning model is possible [9]. Backes et
al. show another study that uses acoustic side-channel combined with machine learning
models to extract information from printers [10].
Exploiting side-channel information for malicious purposes can hamper security, pri-
vacy and pose threats to individuals, organizations, and nations. Researchers show that
cryptographic functions, personal computers, cloud servers, and mobile systems are vul-
nerable to side-channel information leaks [11][12][13][14]. These attacks pose a threat to
national security, trade secrets, and privacy. Studies indicate that systems with no counter-
measures against side-channel information leaks are often vulnerable to attacks. Literature
and studies indicate that by exploiting side-channel information, it is possible to protect,
validate and verify integrity on a wide array of systems, including but not limited to cloud
systems, embedded systems, and safety-critical systems [15][16][17][18].
Using Intrusion detection system (IDS) is a common approach in the field to protect
systems and IDSs which leverage side-channel information are getting more attention with
studies showing that anomaly detection and analysis of side-channel information yields
accurate results about a system [15]. A challenge with side-channel based IDS is that
IDSs require collecting, cleaning and preparing data. These are repetitive tasks that every
researcher needs to do. Thus, this thesis aims to provide a generalized framework for
researchers using machine learning with side-channel data and researchers who aim to
collect large amounts of side-channel data.
This thesis contributes to the literature by providing the following:
• A generalized approach to collect side-channel information from several systems,
Chapter 3.
• A decentralized data pipeline architecture which provides reliable and secure access
to the data, discussed in Chapter 3.
• An assessment of the data pipeline architecture in which the architecture’s capa-
bilities and provides considerations for future side-channel data acquisition systems,
discussed in Chapter 4.
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• A use-case based on the proposed architecture highlights the benefits and comparison




To understand the data pipeline architecture understanding the processes and the termi-
nology is a must. This section provides the necessary background information concerning
the scope of the thesis and the architecture.
2.1 Side-Channel Information
Side-channel information is involuntary information emissions from electronic components
such as computers and embedded devices. Various emissions such as acoustic, power, and
electromagnetic radiation exist and are labelled as side-channels.
To find and measure involuntary emissions, physical access to the target system is often
a requirement. Typical side-channel data acquisition systems include a leakage probe and
an acquisition device such as a digital oscilloscope to collect side-channel information [19].
Figure 2.1 shows an example side-channel acquisition system. For instance, the Device
Under Test (DUT) can be a computer, the leak probe can be a shunt resistor, and the data
acquisition component can be a digital oscilloscope.
Researchers show that using side-channel information makes it possible to attack a
system [11][20]. Attacks include but are not limited to differential power analysis, timing
attacks, and cache attacks [11][20][21].
Exploiting side-channel information to provide defensive measures is another use for
side-channel information. Studies demonstrate that side-channel information is a viable
way to monitor threats and verify run-time operations for a system. For example, Liu et al.
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show that it is possible to implement an authentication and verification layer for Controller
Area Network (CAN) by characterizing voltage from Electronic control units (ECUs) [22].
Another protection system, called CloudRadar, uses cache-based side-channel information
to identify anomalies in multi-tenant cloud systems [15].
Side-channel analysis often involves digital signal processing, statistical methods and
machine learning. These methods contribute to understanding the patterns and informa-
tion in side-channel data. Kocher et al. posit that to analyze data more efficiently, digital
signal processing is an applicable method. CloudRadar also includes various preprocessing
techniques and digital signal processing techniques to provide real-time protection to cloud
systems [11][15].
2.2 Machine Learning
Machine learning can be described as “automatically recognizing patterns in data and
employing extracted patterns to predict future patterns, and making decisions based on
the patterns”. In terms of knowledge and purpose, there are many intersections between
machine-learning, statistics, and data mining [23]. Nevertheless, the tools needed to solve
these problems often differ [24]. For instance, data mining can use rules extracted from the
data, whereas a machine learning model extracts these patterns to formulate a problem.
Machine learning applies to various problems and includes an assemblage of broadly
defined approaches to solving these problems. These approaches are called supervised
learning, unsupervised learning, and reinforcement learning [23]. Typical machine learning
problems include but are not limited to stock prediction, weather forecasting, malware
analysis, spam filtering, threat identification, and anomalous behaviour detection [23].
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Depending on the problem that machine learning is trying to solve, models can predict
or classify data. The classification models categorize data points, whereas predictive models
create data points based on historical data. For example, detecting fraudulent transactions
with a machine learning model uses classification. For this problem, the model tries to
categorize transactions based on the historical data into two categories which are safe and
fraudulent. On the other hand, weather forecasting uses a predictive model. The predictive
model tries to guess whether information for the future using historical weather data.
Machine learning algorithms produce models that can map data collected for the prob-
lem statement to provide outputs based on the mapping [25]. An essential step to building
machine learning models is understanding underlying data and the problem.
Studies demonstrate that side-channel information analysis using machine learning is
possible. Problems associated with side-channel information are solvable using supervised
and unsupervised approaches [26]. Machine learning models can identify patterns and learn
the characteristics of side-channel information. For example, machine learning models were
able to identify malware in the 2019 study by Adnan et al. successfully [17].
Another prevalent name for supervised learning is classification or pattern recogni-
tion [27]. By utilizing labelled data, supervised learning seeks to match patterns in the
data to labels. For example, identifying which emails are spam and not by user input is
supervised learning.
Unsupervised learning implies finding patterns in data without any additional input
than the data itself [27]. With this approach, the problem statement is usually broader,
and often there is no prior information about patterns in the data. For instance, detecting
fraud in online payment systems using log information generated by the users is an example
problem that uses unsupervised learning.
2.2.1 High Dimensional Data
Machine-learning applications that utilize data with high dimensions create challenges
to researchers and industry alike. Having a high number of dimensions is deemed a
curse [28][29]. Researchers attest that it is possible to lift this curse to a particular degree
with dimension reduction techniques [29][30][31]. Techniques such as principal compo-
nent analysis and manifold learning can be proffered as examples of dimension reduction
techniques [32][33]. One challenge of these approaches is that it usually requires an under-
standing of data to a certain degree. For instance, techniques such as Principal component
analysis (PCA) solely apply to linear data. Another challenge is that dimension reduction
techniques may remove patterns or other valuable information while processing data [34].
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In the context of side-channel information, gathered data is often time-series or fre-
quency data. Both time-series and frequency data usually have high dimensionality and
large samples with high resolution. Oscilloscope or similar acquisition devices often collect
side-channel information, and these devices may collect a high number of samples for sev-
eral purposes [19]. One notable reason for having high sampling rates is to preserve the
resolution of the data, which contributes to noise reduction [35]. For example, Agrawal et
al. show that collecting electromagnetic emissions at higher sampling rates enables new
opportunities to craft new attacks [20]. Noise reduction is not the only benefit of having
high-resolution data. Studies also indicate that having data with high resolution may help
machine-learning models extract patterns more efficiently [36].
2.2.2 Large Datasets
Machine learning models can solve more complex problems and learn more with larger
datasets [37][36]. With increased connectivity and the adoption of systems, it is possible
to construct large datasets for machine learning [38][36]. Computer vision-related prob-
lems and machine learning approaches are well-studied examples of using large datasets to
create more robust machine learning models [39]. For example, datasets such as UCF101,
CIFAR-10, Kinetics-700 include large amounts of data curated to solve computer vision
problems. Data sizes vary between datasets; however, they contain a large number of
samples with metadata available. For instance CIFAR-10 includes 60 000 images that are
32x32, UCF101 includes 13 320 video snippets that cover 101 different classes of human
actions, and Kinetics-700 includes snippets from approximately 650 000 videos with high
resolution [40][41][42]. The curation of the datasets enables researchers to test different
machine learning models without requiring further data acquisition, making it feasible to
test different approaches requiring different sizes of datasets. Nevertheless, large datasets
have a common problem which is scalability. As datasets grow in size, manipulating and
managing datasets require more computational resources to conduct machine learning.
Thus, scalable solutions for curating large datasets are a must.
Unlike most systems, such as personal computers, collecting side-channel information
and data from embedded systems poses challenges in scalability due to the need for phys-
ical access [19]. Collecting data from many systems may impact the scalability of data
acquisition methods, making it harder to create curated and large datasets. For instance,
OpenAI left the research space for robotics due to the lack of data and ability to collect




Architectures can link abstract goals for a project with a system design [44]. Abstract
objectives, however, can be explained differently or understood differently by individuals;
this would lead to individuals conjecturing a variant of the project, goal and terminology.
An architecture with formal definitions will remove abstract aspects of the architectural
design that can cause confusion [44]. A system is a combination of structures. Thus we
can say that architecture defines a standard vocabulary for structures within a system [45].
Structures divide into system design categories; these are static modules, dynamic
components, and organizational structures. Each structure represents a different aspect
of an architecture; static modules often represent the foundation of the architecture and
involve technical details about the core functionality; dynamic components explicate the
interchangeable parts in an architecture, which usually consists of business and technical
information. The organizational structures mainly capture the business-related perspective
of architecture.
Defining an architecture around the set of structures we described also requires formal-
izing the requirements for architecture. Requirements can be technical and non-technical,
informing the designers about the core functionality and the business logic. Studies show
that capturing the requirements can be a decisive factor for the success of an architec-
ture [44].
In this chapter, we define our requirements for a decentralized data acquisition pipeline.
We formalize requirements, assumptions, and design choices within the requirement section
while considering our case study and other studies. As mentioned earlier, our architectural
design aims to collect side-channel information from many systems. Thus, the require-
ments include items concerning side-channel information. Nonetheless, we note that our
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approach may prove helpful in other fields by adjusting the provided requirements to curate
a generalized approach.
Requirements define architectural functionality by describing expected features. To for-
malize the functionalities, a functional block diagram visually describes the structure. The
visual representation of the functionality help lay the groundwork required for explaining
components within the diagram. The explanations define the interactions between different
components.
With the functionality of the architecture and architectural components defined, we
provide an example deployment scheme for our architecture. We describe the example
deployment through a deployment diagram and give information about deploying the ar-
chitectural components.
3.1 Requirements
In system design, defining or capturing requirements is considered to be one of the signifi-
cant steps [44]. To capture the requirements, we follow the standard approach of splitting
them into functional and non-functional requirements [46]. Functional requirements specify
how a system behaves and the use-cases of a system. Non-functional requirements, on the
other hand, defines how a system should perform the use-cases and the functionality. For
example, uploading data after collection is a functional requirement, whereas uploading
data after 1 second the data collection occurs is a non-functional requirement.
Both functional and non-functional requirements describe how and what the archi-
tecture does and contain business and technical details. As technical and business re-
quirements often collide, the architecture design needs to compensate by making compro-
mises. For example, encryption in a data pipeline, a functional requirement, can reduce
the pipeline’s throughput. In contrast, a non-functional requirement may specify the need
to operate on a specific throughput and latency.
Our motivation is to minimize the effects caused by compromises and design a scalable
decentralized data acquisition system for side-channel information. For this purpose, we
define our requirements from the business and technical scope of the architecture. The
terminology between requirements may differ based on the scope of a requirement—for
instance, business requirements related to management, budget and timelines regarding
the project. In comparison, technological requirements relate to the project’s technical
aspect and differ based on the domain. Establishing a common terminology between both
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technical and business requirements prevents confusion caused by different terminologies
between scopes.
3.1.1 Terminology
The terminology required to describe the requirements and features of architecture differs
from scope to scope. Thus, we first define a common language to capture and formalize
the terminology used to describe the requirements.
• Enrichment refers to the process of adding contextual information to another in-
formation bit.
• Storage refers to the system which stores data.
• System refers to the Decentralized Data Acquisition Pipeline with Machine Learning
for Side-Channel Information and encapsulates all the components of the architecture
and the architecture.
• Endpoint refers to the device from which data is being gathered.
• Channels refers to data sources such as event data and continuous time-series data.
• Hot Storage refers to data sources such as event data and continuous time-series
data.
• Cold Storage refers to data sources such as event data and continuous time-series
data.
3.1.2 Functional Requirements
Functional requirements set the standard functions and behaviours of a system [47]. As
behaviours and system functions capture what the system is capable of, they also provide
insight with regards to the system use-cases [48]. Use-cases capture actions of the system
and reflect technical details regarding the functionality of architecture. The technical
details provide the level of detail required to develop architecture. In this case, the primary
use case of the proposed architecture is to collect and store data.
To make the requirements accessible, we assign a number prepended with the abbre-
viation FR, functional requirement and then further detail the requirements with short
descriptions.
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FR-1 The system shall support capturing data from multiple endpoints and channels.
FR-2 The system shall support query-able centralized access to hot and cold data.
FR-3 The system shall provide mechanisms to control and manage the data acquisition
process and data storage.
FR-4 The system shall support attaching meta information to data.
FR-5 The system shall provide a callback mechanism at each stage of the data acquisition
process.
FR-6 The system shall support synchronizing data from multiple endpoints and channels.
FR-7 The system shall provide access to performance metrics of the pipeline and storage.
FR-8 The system shall provide role-based access control to data and management functions.
FR-9 The system shall support seamless updates of components.
3.1.3 Non-Functional Requirements
Only by understanding non-functional and functional requirements designers and devel-
opers can implement the structures within an architecture [47][49], Section 3.1.2 provides
the functional requirements for the architecture and this section provides non-functional
requirements. Non-functional requirements of a system focus on items concerning the
performance of a system [47]. In contrast to the functional requirements, non-functional
requirements do not focus on behaviours of the system [48]. Non-functional requirements
show importance as they underline the limitations for performance, scalability, reusability,
accessibility and maintainability [47].
To define the properties of our architecture, we follow the same format we follow in
Section 3.1.2 and assign numbers to the requirements prepended with NFR, standing for
non-functional requirements. The list of non-functional-requirements is as follows.
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NFR-1 Query mechanism should provide at least 10 seconds of data.
NFR-2 The system shall support capturing a minimum of two channels simultaneously.
NFR-3 The system shall provide a lifetime policy of 24 hours for hot storage.
NFR-4 The system shall provide a lifetime policy of a minimum of 30 days for cold storage.
NFR-5 The callbacks from the system shall trigger within 3 minutes.
3.2 Functional View
Formalization of structures within an architecture mitigates risks that may occur during the
implementation phase of an architecture [44]. Formalization removes abstractions for the
system as developers can interpret abstract information differently. Thus, formalizing an
architecture involves creating detailed technical diagrams, as diagrams provide the means
to formalize the structures and technical details without requiring abstract descriptions.
For example, a functional block diagram describes the structural mapping and technical in-
formation necessary to implement an architecture. By doing so, diagrams allow developers
to reach a mutual understanding of the architecture.
This section provides a functional block diagram to show the structure of the archi-
tecture we propose by reducing and removing any abstraction involved. Each item in the
architecture, denoted as a box, in Figure 3.1 refers to a structure or, in other words, a
component. The lines between the boxes represent the interaction and the information
transferred between the components. The architecture contains four main components.
These are DUT, Interceptor, Aggregator, and Analyzer. Figure 3.1 shows the architecture
by defining these components, provided with a description of each component with details
such as use cases. Each component introduces different functionalities to the architecture
based on the requirements defined.
Figure 3.1 shows that the architecture consists of four significant components called
DUT, Interceptor, Aggregator and Analyzer. DUT in this case refers to the target device
for side-channel information collection. The Interceptor is the component responsible for
collecting side-channel information. The Aggregator includes the functionality of gathering
side-channel information from Interceptor(s) and enriching data. The Analyzer component
is responsible for the side-channel information analysis.
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Below we describe each component and the functionality which these components en-
capsulate by describing the sub-components as shown in Figure 3.1.
3.2.1 Device Under Test (DUT)
Figure 3.1 shows the structure of the DUT component within the architecture. DUT is
the target system from which side-channel information gets collected.
Enriching side-channel information by using meta-information is a method to provide
analysts with the means to correlate and differentiate the data, as required by FR-4. To
facilitate this functionality the DUT uses the Telemetry Collector sub-component within
the DUT to send meta-information to the Aggregator component.
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Telemetry Collector
Telemetry Collector collects meta-information from the DUT, as required by FR-4. By
providing meta-information, Telemetry Collector enables attaching meta-information to
side-channel data. After collecting meta-information, the Telemetry Collector relays them
to the Aggregator. The Aggregator component uses meta-information to enrich the side-
channel data, enabling different machine learning approaches, such as supervised learning.
Having enriched data also allows correlating the data. For instance, classification prob-
lems can use the meta-information as labels by correlating data based on DUT to train a
supervised model.
3.2.2 Interceptor
Interceptor component is responsible for the data collection from a DUT, including meta-
information from the DUT and side-channel information. The Interceptor contains three
major functions. These functions are; data acquisition, data transmission, and controlling
the data acquisition.
Data Collector
Data Collector interacts with single or multiple leak probes to collect side-channel infor-
mation, as required by FR-1. The Interceptor is the initial component that interacts with
the data. Side-channel information collection often takes place by using physical probes
targeting the DUT. Data Collector can also utilize digitally available leak probes and col-
lect data from them by interacting with the DUT. Data Collector then forwards the data
for Interceptor Transmitter (IT) transmission. Before transmitting the information, in-
termediary steps such as buffering, filtering, and preparing data for machine learning are
possible tasks for the Data Collector as well as the IT. Depending on the side-channel
source and the representation of data, implementation of pre-processing and analysis may
vary. Thus, to generalize the approach, the architecture design considers implementations
concerning the side-channel leak probe and pre-processing as implementation details that
can change due to end-user requirements.
Data Acquisition Controller (DAC)
Data Acquisition Controller (DAC) is the main controller of all operations within the
Interceptor component, as required by FR-3. It provides an interface to configure the
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data acquisition process. The communication that takes place, as shown in Figure 3.1,
is through network packets that we call Interceptor Control Events. These events are, in
essence, commands which change the internal configuration and setup of an Interceptor.
Commands change, configure, disable, and enable any sub-component within the Inter-
ceptor. Changing sampling rate, enabling or disabling transmission, changing settings
regarding the probe, and changing resource utilization of the Interceptor can be given as
examples to DAC commands.
Interceptor Transmitter (IT)
The IT is a sub-component of the Interceptor, which transmits data to the Aggregator
component as shown in Figure 3.1 and a requirement for implementing FR-1, FR-2, FR-
4, and FR-7. The communication layer between an Aggregator and an Interceptor relies on
IT. Communication takes place via network packets that include side-channel information
and meta-information.
The architecture collects data from many systems, and due to the number of systems
involved, monitoring helps maintain the pipeline and ensure reliable data. Monitoring
contributes to having a scalable and maintainable approach to collect data by providing
insight about the deployed hardware, software, and data [50]. The Interceptor enables
monitoring by sending packets to an Aggregator instance as shown in Figure 3.1. These
packets are Interceptor Heartbeat Packets, a term that covers all metrics and internal logs
acquired from Interceptors themselves. Metrics and internal logs show the configuration
of the Interceptor and metrics such as throughput, errors, and latency logs. As logs and
metrics include details about the data and the pipeline, they can also serve as meta-
information to provide means to differentiate experiments. By monitoring these logs, it is
possible to provide statistics about the pipeline’s state. Correlating telemetry information
from Interceptors can serve as a means to provide labels to the side-channel data.
The Interceptors collect data at high sampling rates to preserve the resolution, which
increases the size of data transfers consuming large amounts of bandwidth. To preserve
more bandwidth and allow higher sampling rates on the side-channel collection IT reduces
data sizes by compressing and hashing certain types of logs and metrics. Hashed infor-
mation includes certain bits of internal logs, such as the configuration of the Interceptor.
Configuration of an Interceptor can be extensive in size due to the information required
to configure the data acquisition process. IT uses compression algorithms such as Snappy,
Zlib, and Gzip to further reduce the size of the metrics and logs by compressing them.
Hashing and deploying a large number of systems require a versioning system to keep
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track of configurations. For this purpose, Analyzer stores configurations and their respec-
tive hashes before deploying the configuration to an Interceptor. The Log Management
Database is the main component that stores the Interceptor configurations and their re-
spective hashes. Provided the query mechanisms of the Log Management Database, it is
possible to use hashes from Interceptors to fetch the related configuration for an Interceptor
from Log Management Database.
Precision Time Protocol (PTP) Client
The analysis uses meta-information to enrich the side-channel information. As the acqui-
sition methods and sampling rates differ between side-channel data and meta-information,
there is a need for synchronization between the meta-information and data, as required
by FR-6. To facilitate time synchronization, the Interceptor makes use of Precision Time
Protocol (PTP).
PTP is a time synchronization protocol defined by the IEEE 1588 standard series.
Synchronization of time between multiple systems takes place via the help of network
packets. The architecture implements PTP based on IEEE 1588-2019 [51]. PTP server is
the main synchronization point and distributes the necessary network packets to facilitate
time synchronization. At the same time, PTP clients make use of the network packets to
synchronize the time to the time of the PTP server.
The time-synchronized between Aggregators and Interceptors allows precise timestamps
in the logs, meta-information and the side-channel information. An example use case that
shows the usefulness of time synchronization is the correlation between data from multiple
DUTs.
3.2.3 Aggregator
The Aggregator is a component that handles the transfer layer between Interceptors and
the Analyzer. Side-channel information often consists of millions of samples; multiple
Interceptors in a network will transmit copious amounts of data. As machine learning and
analysis often employ large computational resources, deploying high-resource hardware for
several Interceptors is not scalable due to the costs attached. The Aggregator acts as an
intermediary layer of hardware and software to help reduce costs. The structure of the
Aggregator is displayed in Figure 3.1. Each instance of an Aggregator represents a node,
a term commonly used within the distributed systems domain [52]. Below we describe the
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functionality of sub-components of the Aggregator and provide information on use-cases
regarding an Aggregator node.
Aggregator Monitor
The Aggregator Monitor is responsible for monitoring sub-components and providing meta-
information, and metrics from sub-components to the Analyzer, as required by FR-7. A
crucial reason behind monitoring Aggregators is to ensure that all operations within the
Aggregator are uninterrupted and the data is reliable. The Aggregator Monitor serves a
critical role in scaling the architecture by collecting necessary metrics to form a decision to
scale the resources for the pipeline [53]. Metrics such as throughput and bandwidth usage
are example metrics that can help form a decision. Due to the number of systems from
which the data pipeline collects data, a monitoring system also provides the necessary tools
and metrics regarding the data. In return, monitoring the data ensures that the data is
reliable. For instance, users can acknowledge that the pipeline is running at full capacity,
meaning no data was lost during that period.
Log Forwarder
Log Forwarder sub-component relays data from multiple Interceptors to the Interceptor
Receiver & Forwarder (IRF) and the Analyzer, which is a requirement specified by FR-
4, and FR-7. Received data consists of different types, Interceptor Heartbeat Packet
(IHP) and DUT metrics, logs and meta-information. The IRF uses metrics, logs, and
meta-information to tag and enrich side-channel information.
The Analyzer stores files as objects in an S3 Storage and uses tags and the available
meta-information from the objects attached in the Aggregator. In a way, Log Forwarder
provides data necessary to provide context to the side-channel information as well as metrics
and logs to monitor the system.
Interceptor Receiver & Forwarder (IRF)
The IRF sub-component is responsible for collecting side-channel data from several Inter-
ceptors that have access to the Aggregator instance, as required by FR-1, and FR-2. The
communication layer consists of network packets between Interceptors and Aggregators.
IRF receives the packets and decodes them into two different types of packets. These
packets are IHP and Side-Channel Information Packets.
17
Interceptor Heartbeat Packet (IHP) Definition we provided on section 3.2.2 was
that each IHP provides telemetry information regarding the Interceptor sending the IHP
and metadata regarding the data being collected. IRF first decodes IHPs and then stores
the log information. We define the decoding process as operations that do not alter or
modify the raw data.
Side-Channel Information Packet (SCIP) Side-Channel Information Packets con-
tain side-channel data and compromises most of the traffic between an Interceptor and an
Aggregator. IRF minimizes the number of processing done on the side-channel information
to maintain throughput to ensure that the Aggregator does not require many resources.
The IRF processes SCIPs in the order of adding meta-information to data, decoding, and
compression of data. The decoding process is the same process we define in Section 3.2.3.
Adding meta-information requires some assumption about the IHP packets received,
as the interval may vary compared to SCIPs. Thus, we act with the assumption that
the last received IHP is accurate for the given side-channel information. Metrics, log and
meta-information, should be sent from DUT at the same rate with SCIPs to provide more
resolution if needed.
The IRF converts the decoded SCIPs with additional meta information to a file to store
them in the Analyzer. The file can use various file formats depending on the requirements
of the user. For example, some users may prefer Comma Separated Values (CSV) format,
and the others may prefer JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) and so on. However, to
fully utilize the architecture and features, the architecture fully integrates with a handful
of file formats. This chapter provides a comparison table for a set of file formats to show
which file formats fully integrate with the architecture.
The Aggregator is the only communication point to the Analyzer, thus to preserve
bandwidth, the Aggregator implements methods such as compression during file generation.
File creation and file formatting occur in volatile memory, reducing the number of I/O
operations to preserve throughput. During this process, the IRF compresses data, reducing
the file sizes. Reduction in the data sizes allows preserving Aggregator bandwidth, which
in return allows more.
The IRF streams the files to the side-channel data storage system. The architecture
uses S3 Object Storage as the side-channel data storage system, as shown in Figure 3.1.
However, alternative solutions and file systems do not provide the same set of tools as an
S3 Object Storage. Section 3.2.4 provides a list of alternatives and discusses them to the
S3 Object Storage to detail the design decision behind using S3 Object Storage.
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Different file-formats support different use-cases and need to satisfy the architecture
requirements. For example, retrieving the file in chunks, query support with the storage
system is a requirement specified in Section 3.1. The set of file-formats provided in Table 3.1
relates to big data-related problems or commonly used file formats for machine learning
and analysis. Thus, the majority of the file-formats meet the requirements for analysis
involving large amounts of data. Table 3.1 shows the comparison of file-formats based on
three different categories. These categories are S3 query support, compression support and
chunk support. To provide further details about the formats, we offer a short description
of our evaluation for each file format.
File Format S3 Query Sup-
port
Compression Chunk
Raw Binary - - -
CSV + GZIP or BZIP2 +1
JSON + GZIP or BZIP2 -
Apache Parquet + GZIP or Snappy -
Apache ORC - Zlib or Snappy -
1Only when the file is not compressed.
Table 3.1: File format evaluation
Raw Binary The format holds the information as a binary blob, without including out-
of-the-box mechanisms that exist in other file formats we evaluate. It requires additions to
be made to the components to enable features such as compression as there is no out-of-the-
box implementation readily available, as shown in Figure 3.1. S3 query systems support
for file-formats differ based on the implementation. In our case, all the alternatives we
consider in Table 3.3 indicate that there is no query system support for raw binary files.
With the number of changes and the lack of support on multiple features, we consider raw
binary file format unsuitable for our architecture.
Comma Separated Values(CSV) CSV format is a human-readable text-based file
format that separates data through commas and line breaks [54]. Architecture requires
additions to the components to use compression. S3 query does support querying files
in CSV format, uncompressed or compressed. However, only two compression methods
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are supported when used with an S3 query system. Implementing special readers allow
splitting CSV files into chunks. However, to query compressed data, it must be read in full.
Features such as compression are not available out of the box. Feature compatibility wise
CSV meets the majority of the requirements except splitting the files into chunks while
using compression. Nonetheless, we consider CSV an alternative file format that requires
additions to the existing structure of our architecture to meet the requirements fully.
JavaScript Object Notation(JSON) JSON format is a human-readable text-based
file format [55]. Compression support is the same with CSV format. To be compatible with
the S3 query system, compression of JSON format can be done via either GZIP or BZIP2
methods. When the data is uncompressed S3 query system functions as intended and
allows users to query data. Splitting JSON files is not possible without loading the data
in full. Therefore we consider JSON format to fail the evaluation criteria about splitting
a file into chunks.
Apache Parquet Apache Parquet format is a columnar data format designed for big
data with non-lossy compression [56]. The format supports several compression methods
such as GZIP, Snappy, LZ4 [56]. Nonetheless, Apache Parquet support depends on the
implementation of the S3 Object Storage. For our evaluation, we use the S3 Object Storage
implementations we list in Table 3.3. These S3 Object Storage implementations support
Apache Parquet when files use GZIP or Snappy algorithms to compress data on the column
level. Regardless of the compression, the S3 query system can split Parquet files into chunks
and fetch them without fully loading the file. Thus, making the Apache Parquet format a
viable solution for the Architecture.
Apache ORC Apache ORC is a type aware columnar format designed by Apache with
support for large streaming reads [57]. Apache ORC format supports compression with
various methods and can split files into chunks without loading them fully; however, S3
query support for Apache ORC is non-existent. Nevertheless, due to a lack of S3 query
support, the Apache ORC format does not satisfy the requirements.
Based on the comparison in Table 3.1 Apache Parquet format satisfy the requirements
of the architecture. Thus, it is a viable option to use as the file format for the architecture.
Uploading is a network-dependent operation that involves risks such as losing network
packets. Thus, the architecture considers potential data loss during implementation to
include fail-safe mechanisms to ensure data reliability. The IRF provides a fail-safe mech-
anism and saves the data locally in the case that upload fails, followed by an exponential
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back-off retry strategy to upload the data. As the exponential back-off strategy will cause
IRF to accumulate resources, after a certain threshold of time reached data IRF deletes the
locally available data. Without a deletion policy, data can take up the limited resources
available in an Aggregator, causing losses on the incoming new data.
Interceptor Controller
Interceptor Controller (IC) is the sub-component responsible for sending commands to
Interceptors connected to an Aggregator, as required by FR-3. IC provides capabilities
that allow remotely configuring and interacting with an Interceptor while removing the need
to interact with an Interceptor physically as such IC allows the users of our architecture
to change the configuration of the Interceptor from a remote location. If the side-channel
source is digitally available, the controller can be utilized to organize data collection and
overall maintenance of the Interceptor remotely.
The communication takes place between the Interceptor and the Aggregator as shown
in Figure 3.1 through Interceptor Control Events we defined earlier in Section 3.2.2. With
the communication line represents, our architecture provides enhancement over the data.
Arranging data collection with different parameters is possible remotely without requiring
changes in the physical setup and the positioning of a leak probe. For machine learning
and analysis, keeping experiment settings the same is crucial due to data quality concerns.
Within the side-channel domain, having the probe simultaneously without any physical
changes ensures consistent leak source measurements. Having the measures consistent
helps reduce the noise as filtering out noise becomes less challenging. Thus, by limiting
the physical movement of the probe by having remote access to data acquisition system
configuration and actions, IC enhances data qualities that are well-defined in the big data
community [58].
Precision Time Protocol (PTP) Server
We follow the same description provided in Section and adhere to the standard IEEE 1588-
2019 [51]. Hence, PTP Server in Aggregators is responsible for keeping all the connected
interceptors in a time-synchronized state.
We underlined the benefits of having PTP previously to expand on it; time synchro-
nization provides consistency for the data as the timestamps stay consistent between the
Aggregator and the Interceptor. As we see in Figure 3.1 the additional meta information
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from Interceptor and Aggregator itself is also available to provide contextual informa-
tion to data. PTP server is responsible for keeping all the connected interceptors in a
time-synchronized state; by doing so, information transfer between the Interceptor and
Aggregators stays consistent in terms of time. Having a time synchronization also helps
analysis as side-channel information objects sent to S3 Storage include timestamps. Due
to the synchronous time, some machine learning problems also become less challenging;
an example problem that requires synchronous time is determining patterns over multiple
interceptors. Thus, time synchronization allows us to enrich and add contextual informa-
tion to data via available meta-information for a given time frame with accuracy and the
limitations of the PTP as described in IEEE 1588-2019 [51].
3.2.4 Analyzer
The Analyzer component of the proposed architecture provides a ground for analysis and
machine learning functionalities within the described pipeline. The Analyzer can deploy
using cloud services and bare metal. Regardless of the deployment type, the Analyzer func-
tions as a data lake, given the S3 Object Storage system deployment within the Analyzer
as shown in Figure 3.1. To provide contextual information and enrich data, the Analyzer
also contains a Log Management Database. Utilizing this database, it is also possible to
accumulate metrics regarding the pipeline itself. Thus, providing means to monitor the
overall architecture.
In Analyzer, the machine learning models and analysis steps get triggered via event
notifications from both S3 Object Storage and Log Management Database. Thus, we in-
troduce Model Executor, a sub-component that oversees available machine learning models
and analysis processes.
As the S3 Object Storage and Log Management Database pipeline consistently provides
contextual information, we consider machine learning models developed on the data to
be reusable later with similarly represented side-channel data without defining machine
learning model architectures from scratch. Analysis processes are also transferable to
again expressed side-channel data within this context. The architecture requires machine
learning models and analysis sub-components to be pluggable to provide this transferability
without further efforts. By having machine learning models pluggable, the architecture
enables other learning techniques such as ensemble learning.
22
S3 Object Storage
Side-channel information is often high dimensional and high-frequency data, as we de-
scribed earlier. Storing such data requires a storage system that can scale and adhere to
the requirements such as FR-2. With the developments in the cloud domain and big data
domain, many storage systems have been developed. The decision on using S3 object stor-
age was the result of an evaluation of the storage systems compared to the requirements
of the architecture defined earlier in Section 3.1. Thus, To explain our decision about the
S3 Object Storage, we provide the following evaluation shown in Table 3.2.
System Name Distributed Query Engine Meta Information Versioning
S3 Object Stor-
age
+ + + +
Apache Hadoop + + + -
NFS + - - -
SMB + - - -
Table 3.2: Scenario Interaction based on Major Components
As we show in Table 3.2, both Apache Hadoop and S3 Object Storage meet the require-
ments specified without requiring additional tools. However, in the architecture, we make
use of S3 Object Storage. The reason we prefer S3 Object Storage is that it includes an
additional feature which is versioning. Considering future iterations and use-cases, having
an extra feature such as versioning would provide flexibility to users. The flexibility is
desirable as the architecture aims to reduce the implementation-related efforts. To explain
our decision, we further detail the advantages of S3 Object Storage.
S3 Object Storage has access control systems embedded, which provide authentication
and permission management with granular settings as required by FR-8. These features
allow conducting data management-related tasks in an organized manner. For example,
analysis and machine learning-related software can use read-only access, whereas data
management software can use write-only access to specific objects. Using policies to access
data also reduces other risks such as accidental modifications to the data, contributing
significantly to data reliability.
The versioning feature is extra to the requirements and provides flexibility for future
use-cases. It allows organizing data for analysis and machine learning models by reducing
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the computations. Utilizing the data versioning analysis process can generate alternative
data representations, marking them as versions without losing the link to the original raw
data. For example, each pre-processing step can store data as a version with the callback
system of the architecture, providing the means to test various machine learning models
against a different version of data without repeating pre-processing.
A standard interface of objects creates a common interface to process and analyze
data. Similarities in the data representation for side-channel information make it possible
to implement machine learning models once and test against different experiments or side-
channel sources.
Another advantage of S3 Object Storage is that it supports streaming data on upload
and download, meaning a file can grow in size while also downloading the data. Some
machine learning approaches utilize this feature more than other such as models which use
online training.
With the S3 Object Storage query mechanism, analysis processes and machine learning
models have access to data filtering capabilities without additional tools required. S3
Object Storage provides access to contextual information, and the ability to fetch this
information without manual look-ups offers flexibility to both machine learning and data
management. Because data is in large volumes, the ability to query files directly without
knowing the contents provides reliable access to filtering and accessing data.
We also note that the S3 Object Storage query system has fewer features than tra-
ditional RDBMSs in terms of capabilities. Nevertheless, the S3 Object Storage query
system can support various functions that reduce, select and filter data. S3 Object Stor-
age implementations in the industry have query mechanisms for certain file formats such as
CSV [54], JSON [55], Apache Parquet [56] as mentioned earlier. Considering the evaluation
in Table 3.1, alternatives to Parquet exist but require further changes to the architecture.
S3 Object Storage has many implementations available; most of the implementations
match in features; nonetheless, for our architecture, we provide available alternatives that
meet our requirements and provide properties such as licensing and deployment type for
them. We show possible options in Table 3.3 which provides an insight into the deployment
of the S3 Object Storage.
Log Management Database
The data pipeline collects meta and metric information regarding data and the pipeline
itself per requirements FR-1, FR-4, and FR-7. A storage solution is necessary to store
24
Storage System Deployment Query Engine License
AWS S3 Cloud CSV, JSON, Par-
quet
Proprietary
MinIO On Premises CSV, JSON, Par-
quet
AGPLv3
Ceph On Premises CSV, JSON, Par-
quet
LGPLv2.1
Table 3.3: S3 Implementation Comparison
meta and metric information. Log Management Database exists for this purpose; it helps
facilitate a storage environment. With the amount of data going through the pipeline, a
scalable third-party solution meets the non-functional requirements is preferable.
Model Executor
The Model Executor facilitates the callback mechanism within the Analyzer, as required by
FR-5. The Analyzer receives data from many Interceptors and makes use of callbacks to
automate the analysis process. The Model Executor is the sub-component that implements
the callback mechanism,
The data intake is significant, and the Model Executor reduces the tasks in the Analyzer
to smaller chunks allowing techniques such as batch processing to analyze data. With
limited resources using this sub-component, managing the Analyzer resources becomes less
challenging.
3.2.5 Machine Learning Models
Machine learning models provide outputs of the analysis in the architecture and answers
to problems trying to be solved, such as the effect of cryptographic operations on CPU
utilization. The architecture does not limit the defined set of problems and allows anal-
ysis processes and machine learning models to answer most problems without additional
changes in the system. As machine learning also ties to data quality, we describe the
properties or functionalities within the architecture that preserve data reliability and qual-
ity. For instance, object versioning, tagging, and Identity and Access Management (IAM)
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in the S3 Object Storage ensure users access data only they are associated with limited
rights. In this case, write permissions are an example of the limitations users have. The
architecture limits users to only read data without writing permissions to ensure that raw
data is non-modified and preserved. Having policies and permissions also helps organize
machine learning models as data access policies can be determined per model.
The out-of-the-box features of the S3 system also help provision data with often required
features such as querying and filtering, as required by FR-2. Out-of-the-box features
allow the data scientist to apply machine learning models instead of additional tooling
requirements in the data pipeline between models and the storage. Using the data storage
system as mentioned, models can be applied to different data in terms of properties. The
sampling rate can be tested without requiring the analysis code to be written from scratch.
By leveraging existing data storage systems, organizing analysis and machine learning
models require less implementation effort. For this purpose, the architecture standardizes
machine learning tools and reusable software components. Reducing the resources to build
machine learning modelling techniques can be written once code-wise. Reduction in effort
to build machine learning model makes it possible to apply machine learning models with
no additional requirements if the data representation is the same or similar form. Thus, it
is possible to reuse already implemented approaches with the same or different side-channel
sources without modifying the process itself. Machine learning model training, testing and
validating models is possible without changing many components within the architecture.
By utilizing the versioning system on the S3 storage system, pre-processing steps can be
applied without modifications to the existing tools when the data representation is similar.
Tools can be applied re-applied to create versions of new types of raw data. Using pre-
processing, as mentioned, also makes it possible to apply machine learning models with
different pre-processing technique combinations. In essence, our proposed architecture
provides a flexible testing environment to side-channel sources with identical or similar
representation.
3.3 Deployment View
Deployment view or, in other words, deployment diagram of architecture provides means
to translate the abstract architecture to real-world use cases [59]. By providing a com-
plete instance of the architecture, we understand the way architecture deploys and works
in reality. We estimate the hardware requirements, and a guideline on the deployment
allows users to enable the pipeline for production use. Thus, reducing the implementation
26
risks of the architecture and formally documenting the requirements to deploy the archi-
tecture [44] [59]. We use the term operational requirements to describe requirements to
deploy and use the pipeline. Operational requirements of architecture can be the cost of
the components, hardware requirements, network requirements and other details.
Deployment diagrams in a distributed setting also help determine the critical points in
architecture; by critical points, we refer to the critical components critical to a system’s
operation. In the cases these components fail, the process will cease impacting the use.
As distributed systems deploy across different physical locations, identifying critical points
and managing them may help reduce the physical access required to update, fix or use
these systems. As such, in Figure 3.2 we provide the locations of the major components.
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As seen in Figure 3.2 Interceptors and Aggregators locate on the same site within a
network where they have access to each other. Their interactions and data transfer are over
User Datagram Protocol (UDP). We note that alternatives to UDP exist and apply to our
architecture. The key reason to use UDP is that it is less resource-intensive compared to
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the Transmission Control Protocol (TCP), given high sampling rates and high throughput
requirements, we chose UDP to gain more throughput. On the other hand, we consider
Analyzer fully remote to the other components in the system. Analyzer functionality
mimics micro-services architecture. Analyzer deployment can be done through many cloud
services, cloud servers, or a server.
Regarding hardware requirements, we know that factors such as sampling rate and the
side-channel source affect these requirements. As we provide a generalized instance of the
architecture, we do not make any assumptions for the hardware resource requirements. In
our case study on Chapter 5, we show how we determine the hardware requirements based





A software architecture consists of a structure and a set of requirements for a system.
Understanding the structure and requirements allow developers to build systems that have
quality attributes such as maintainability. Quality attributes are traits that contribute to
the architecture’s quality, just like the functionality of the architecture. Understanding
whether architecture is high quality or not involves assessing the architecture. The ar-
chitecture must show that it meets the functionality and has a set of quality attributes
during the assessment. These attributes differ from architecture to architecture, depend-
ing on the structure and functionality. Nevertheless, the assessment requires a consistent
methodology. Software Architecture Analysis Method (SAAM) process is a software ar-
chitecture evaluation method that helps evaluate architectures based on a set of scenarios.
This chapter provides an evaluation of the architecture proposed in Chapter 3 based on
the SAAM process under different scenarios assessing whether the architecture has specific
quality attributes as part of its traits.
4.1 Introduction to Software Architecture Analysis
Method (SAAM)
The SAAM process is an architectural analysis and evaluation method proposed by Kaz-
man et al. in 1994. Architectures require structured definitions that capture all features
of the system to analyze an architecture. Kazman et al., 1994, describe that functionality,
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structure, and allocation entail perspectives required for understanding the architecture.
Evaluating the architecture by using SAAM is possible once all the perspectives are estab-
lished [60].
Kazman et al. describe a set of activities of the SAAM process to evaluate and analyze
an architecture. These activities consist of the following steps:
1. Characterize a canonical functional partitioning for the domain.
2. Map the functional partitioning onto the architecture’s structural decom-
position.
3. Choose a set of quality attributes with which to assess the architecture.
4. Choose a set of concrete tasks which test the desired quality attributes.
5. Evaluate the degree to which each architecture provides support for each
task.
Chapter 3 defines the structure and the functional partitioning of our proposed archi-
tecture through diagrams, requirements and functionality descriptions for components in
the architecture. As such, for the SAAM process, we consider Step 1 and Step 2 to be
completed through the analysis shown in Chapter 3. For Step 3 of SAAM, we define a set
of quality attributes that can be used to evaluate the proposed architecture. We describe
quality attributes under Section 4.3.1
4.2 Motivation & Goal
Different views can represent an architecture, and we describe the following three here:
the architecture’s functional mapping to a domain, the architecture’s structure and fitting
functional mappings to the architecture’s structure [60][44]. Software engineers can use
these views to design and display an architecture, as we did in Chapter 3.
Functional views provide an insight into the system’s functions and behaviour. The
insight gained from functional views is valuable for understanding the architecture; how-
ever, it is not enough to deem an architecture good or bad. The quality of architecture is
different from providing a functional view [44].
Architectures consider functionality and quality attributes that show the extent of the
success of the architecture. Quality attributes describe the extent to which the architecture
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is successful about certain traits. Maintainability is an example trait that requires the
necessary functionality and traits to be in place to operate and maintain a data pipeline.
Quality attributes define a system’s worth, and developers should pay attention to the
quality attributes of the architecture during the design and implementation. In reality,
developers often consider functionality first and then consider quality attributes, which
ends up with architectures that lack desired quality attributes. The leading cause of this is
cost and time constraints, forcing developers and designers to choose between functionality
and quality attributes.
Confirming whether architecture has specific quality attributes while meeting the func-
tionality requirements require an assessment. Qualities such as portability, maintainability,
and scalability must also be considered to design and implement functional and high-quality
software. Studies label architectures good, if the system implemented from the architecture
meets all the required quality attributes [61].
Focusing solely on the functionality of a system causes developers and designers to over-
look quality measures of architecture, with factors such as organizational pressure, stress
and time constraints affecting developers. Developers and designers do not have an incen-
tive to make design changes on architectures as long as the system is feature/functionality-
wise complete [62][63][64][65]. As such, systems are often subject to redesign due to the
lack of the quality attributes of the architecture rather than a lack of functionality [44].
Nowadays, most critical software systems and their architectures involve architecture eval-
uations when making design choices. When the assessment is inadequate or non-existent,
the outcome can be a bad architectural design which can be unpleasant, costly, and fatal
depending on the type of software. Examples such as Pentium FDIV Defect [66], EDS
Child Support System Defect [67], Boeing 737 Max 8 MCAS Defect [68] suggest that it is
imperative to evaluate architectural decisions and design.
Architectural evaluations and overviews provide the capability to designer teams to
catch costly mistakes early on. In this case, we evaluate the proposed architecture post-
design and try to determine the shortcomings. By doing so, determining whether the
proposed architecture is good is possible. Thus, the architecture requires an analysis that
considers a set of quality attributes often seen in data pipelines. For this purpose, we




The definition provided in Section 4.1 captures all of the required steps for SAAM. In
this section, we proceed in the same order as the steps defined. Then we determine the
quality attributes for the proposed architecture. By describing selected quality attributes,
we proceed to create scenarios as described in Step-4 of SAAM for the architecture.
Chapter 3 provides the functional mapping definition of the architecture and completes
Step-1 and Step-2 of the SAAM process. Step-3 of SAAM requires us to define a set of
quality attributes to evaluate the architecture. Thus, the following section provides a set
of quality attributes.
4.3.1 Quality Attributes for SAAM
Quality attributes for a data pipeline consist of two primary subjects, data and the pipeline
itself [45][69]. To understand which quality attributes to evaluate for the architecture, us-
ing standards is a standard practice in the industry and research environments. Thus, we
define our quality attributes by reviewing software architectures that involve data pipelines,
software evaluation methodologies, and software quality to refine a set of quality attributes
based on our review [70][71][72][58][73]. ISO/IEC 25010:2011 describes quality attributes
for software architectures in general. Quality attributes such as functional suitability,
reliability, performance efficiency, use-ability, security, compatibility, maintainability, and
portability describe the quality of a software architecture per ISO/IEC 25010:2011 [74]. We
select a subset of attributes based on the ISO/IEC 25010:2011 and combine the attributes
with others based on our literature review. We define the quality attributes as maintain-
ability, scalability, reliability and reusability per SAAM. We provide a short description of
each attribute and why we think they are relevant to our architecture.
Maintainability
Maintainability considers actions taken to preserve the system [75]. Tasks such as data
management and pipeline monitoring are relevant to maintainability. Upgrading several
systems connected in the data pipeline is another item that impacts maintainability. As
such assessing maintainability is a major quality attribute that requires an assessment.
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Reusability
Reusability refers to the action of recycling the existing software components or architec-
ture to meet the requirements of different use-cases [76]. In the side-channel information
domain, there can be many side-channel sources. Thus, to understand whether our archi-
tecture provides a general architecture for all side-channel sources, we consider reusability
a primary quality attribute that must be assessed.
Reliability
Software systems and architectures are subject to errors in design and implementation.
Reliability means that a software system or architecture is error-prone or fail-safe during
operation [77]. Reliability is a crucial quality attribute for architecture as failures can
prevent expected functionality [76]. In a data pipeline, reliability affects the operation
and the data [78]. For example, failures can cause loss and modifications to the data.
Scalability
The scalability attribute shows whether architecture can be used with the increasing work-
load without making any changes to the architecture except adding more resources to the
architecture [79]. Scalability is a crucial attribute for the future success of a system as large
amounts of data stream through the data pipeline from multiple systems. The scalability
requirement of the architecture draws similarities to a distributed system [80].
4.3.2 Scenarios
SAAM is a scenario-based evaluation method requiring different scenarios that captures a
variety of possible actions with the system. Scenario definitions take the data acquisition
process and data itself into consideration. For instance, from the data perspective, scenarios
consider tasks such as data labelling, data cleaning, data sharing, and data querying into
consideration [78]. Data acquisition process-wise scenarios incorporate data management,
pipeline configuration, and software maintenance.
As part of the SAAM we define 25 scenarios. This section lists, provides short de-
scriptions for the scenarios and show all 25 scenarios in Table 4.1 with labels as defined in
Section 4.1, and the changes required based on the descriptions of the scenarios as defined
by SAAM [81].
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SAAM requires stakeholders contribute to the scenarios and the architectural design.
The architecture separates stakeholders into four groups of users within the system. The
groups are Data Managers, Service Managers, Analysts and Data Collection Managers.
Each group of users has their responsibilities in the use of the architecture. Data Man-
agers is responsible for managing storage systems and making data available to other user
groups. Service Managers monitor the pipeline and maintains the running services. Ana-
lysts analyze data to create machine learning models and draw conclusions from exploring
the data. Data Collection Managers are responsible for coordinating other groups and de-
ciding how the data is provided with metadata for different experiments or data collection
scenarios.
Below we categorize the scenarios based on the predominantly affected quality attribute
while providing a short description for each scenario.
Maintainability Scenarios
M-1 Provide access to side-channel data based on role
Data Managers need to ensure that data is not modifiable by other groups and enforce
that only the pipeline has to write access to the S3 storage, preserving maintainability.
M-2 Label data during collection
Data Collection Managers need a way to categorize the set of data collection scenarios
or experiments. Analysts can use the labels to utilize supervised machine learning
models.
M-3 Send Control Events to Interceptors through Analyzer
Service Managers need to manage Interceptors, when a large number of Interceptors
and Aggregators are deployed. This is meant to manage all or a set of Interceptors
directly from an Analyzer without any intermediary helps maintain ease-of-use.
M-4 View Interceptor telemetry data
Service Managers and Analysts need to view information from Interceptor to the
label to provide context to data and monitor Interceptor status.
M-5 Collect different data collection scenarios at the same time.
Data Collection Managers may want to parallelize data collection across different
locations and collect different types of data.
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M-6 Migrate to a different storage system that is not S3 compliant
Data Managers and Data Collection Managers may prefer to use another storage
solution or swap the S3 storage for a newer solution.
Reusability Scenarios
RES-1 Use a different file format other than Apache Parquet.
Data Managers and Analysts may want to use another file format based on their
experience or replace Apache Parquet with a newer file format.
RES-2 Store different versions of data without additional structuring.
Data Managers can manage one structure vs many, and Analysts can organize pro-
cessed data for machine learning models.
RES-3 Apply pre-processing steps to data upon arrival to the Analyze.r
Analysts can use different pre-processing steps before feeding data to a machine
learning model. Applying pre-processing steps that Analysts determine on arrival to
Analyzer provides data that can be directly fed into machine learning models.
RES-4 Use the Interceptor to capture a different side-channel information.
The architecture should not focus on a single side-channel source but in-fact should
allow different side-channel sources.
Reliability Scenarios
REL-1 Change settings and configuration of a DUT
As analysis relies on consistency, having a way to control the configuration of DUT
helps collect data reliably.
REL-2 The data pipeline continues to function when the Aggregator fails to op-
erate
The Aggregator can fail and stop responding within the pipeline. The pipeline in
this scenario will lose data from the Interceptors connected to the Aggregator. Thus,
the system needs to ensure data is not lost.
REL-3 Synchronize time between Aggregators
The pipeline collects data from multiple systems and multiple data sources such as
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meta-information and side-channel information. Analysis requires the data sources
to be in sync in order to provide meaningful results. Thus, synchronizing time al-
lows the pipeline to collect reliable data. Analysts, Data Collection Managers and
Data Managers may require reviews on the raw data by looking at the contextual
information.
REL-4 Recover from an Aggregator crash
Aggregator crashing can cause data losses as Interceptors will continue transmitting
data. Recovering from a crash on the Aggregator instance, the system can include
tools that ensure that services are restarted, such as the IRF sub-component.
REL-5 Use redundancy for Aggregator
Many Interceptors connect to a single Aggregator node instance. In the case of a
failure, if the traffic passes through a redundant instance, the pipeline will reduce the
risk of losing data in the case of a failure occurs.
Scalability Scenarios
S-1 Collect multiple channels at the same time
Different data sources exist, and Data Collection Managers can decide to collect
multiple sources simultaneously, which impacts the scalability of the pipeline as more
information will be transferred and collected.
S-2 Execute a callback after data transmission on Interceptor
The system can require callbacks to be executed right after an event such as data
transmission. For example, Interceptor can execute a callback that adjusts the leak
probe after transmitting data.
S-3 Use a cloud-based S3 storage
Data Managers may opt to use cloud-based S3 storage instead of maintaining S3
storage themselves.
S-4 Run multiple instances of Analyzer at the same time.
Analysis and machine learning often resource extensive. Having the capability to
run multiple Analyzer nodes is a possible method in this case to increase resources.
After defining and describing scenarios rest of the SAAM steps are applicable to evaluate
the system. The evaluation takes place over a set of quality attributes determined by
stakeholders. Today, standards define the quality attributes that architecture should have,
36
such as defined in ISO 25010 [74]. The analysis uses the following set of quality attributes
to assess the architecture. The set consists of maintainability, reusability, upgradability
and modifiability of the architecture.
4.3.3 Evaluating Component-Scenario Interactions
Understanding the interactions between components and scenarios require an assessment.
Scenarios need to be assessed to determine whether they are directly applicable to the ar-
chitecture or indirectly applicable with a set of changes being required [81]. Thus, scenarios
identifies as direct or indirect per SAAM. Provided scenarios with their respective identity
further assessment of indirect scenarios is a requirement. Table 4.1 defines these changes
and specifies the identity assigned to the scenarios similar to the case study provided by
Kazman et al., 1996 [81].
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Analyzer
Section 4.1 defined SAAM as a method that evaluates the interactions between scenarios
and the architectural modules or components. As with Kazman et al., 1996 we use a similar
representation of the interactions and present them via a table. With Table 4.1 we show
which scenarios are supported without requiring changes versus which scenarios require
minor or significant changes. SAAM helps provide insight on possible future cases and
decisions that may happen after the deployment of an architecture. When we review
Kazman et al., 1996 we also see similar findings based on a Scenario Evaluation Table.
We can identify the interaction between scenarios and components by reviewing the sce-
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narios and required changes in Table 4.1. These interactions indicate possible features for
the architecture, which may be implemented in the future. Having information about fu-
ture cases provides insight for architecture development because, as technology progresses,
tools can be replaced by newer alternatives that can meet the requirements.
By clearly establishing our proposed architecture’s capabilities, we prepare the under-
lying work of defining points that an alternate may replace in the future. This will help
reduce the risks around the development and implementation of the architecture while
capturing flexible parts of the architecture.




Device Under Test (DUT) 1
Table 4.2: Scenario Interaction based on Major Components
Based on Table 4.1 and Table 4.2, we can see that the Analyzer component requires four
changes followed by the Aggregator with five changes based on the scenarios we crafted. On
the other hand Interceptor has two changes, and DUT has a single change. Interceptor and
DUT when compared to the other components, do not require as many changes indicating
less complexity when the structural definition provided in Chapter 3 is considered. On
the other hand, analyzing the changes needed in Table 4.1 and several changes required in
Table 4.2 we can conclude that the Analyzer and the Aggregator are responsible for more
complex operations within the architecture. The structural mapping, sub-components and
functionality described in Chapter 3 also align with this conclusion. To illustrate the effects
of the analysis on quality attributes in detail, we provide our analysis separately for each
major component within this section.
Device Under Test (DUT)
DUT as we describe in Chapter 3 is the hardware device from which the pipeline captures
side-channel information from. As shown in Chapter 3 the pipeline collects side-channel
and telemetry information from the DUT. The interactio
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By having a layer of interaction between DUT’s software and our architecture, we
can provide an analysis of the DUT component regarding scenarios that affect how the
side-channel information gets collected.
Maintainability As we collect telemetry logs from a DUT, we have the means to monitor
and assess activities. Possessing such information provides the means to have to oversee
the data being collected. Thus, by using the logs, maintaining the status of the system is
possible. However, without any control mechanism over the DUT, it removes any possibility
to intervene in the device. Hardware control mechanisms like Power over Ethernet switches
may contribute towards maintainability; however, a lack of control over the software will
persist without any means to control the DUT.
Side-channel data acquisition happens independent of the DUT with the help of a
probe; thus, in the case that an issue arises over the DUT, issues will pollute the data
collection. As query mechanisms that can filter out data based on telemetry logs exist, the
data can be filtered to remove the polluted data; however, having such a case will increase
the analysis and machine learning modelling efforts.
Due to the lack of control mechanisms on the DUT required changes affect the main-
tainability negatively on the component and architectural level. To provide a reason,
considering our architecture’s decentralized and the large number of systems connected to
the pipeline, lacking any control over multiple systems prevents pipeline and data main-
tainability throughout the system.
Our findings suggest a possible remedy to reduce the impact of problems that may exist
on data. However, they introduce additional complexity, resource, and time costs to the
pipeline’s machine learning and analysis parts.
Reusability Reusability of the architecture relies on whether components within the
architecture are reusable as the DUT is the source of telemetry data, and the targeted
system for side-channel reusability of DUT significantly impacts the reusability of the
architecture. Side-channels can vary, and data can be collected from any electronics that
leak information, and many side-channel sources exist. In this context, swapping the
DUT with another does not impact the pipeline regarding how the data is transferred.
However, it may affect the representation of its data. As described in Chapter 3, there are
two possible conditions if the data representation does not change and machine learning
models are reusable.
In comparison, different representations require analysis and machine learning mod-
elling to be repeated. Nonetheless, existing models and techniques can be modified to a
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certain degree by adjusting the query mechanisms. Depending on the perspective, we can
argue that the data with different representations present another analysis problem. Thus,
applying analysis and machine learning will be required no matter what the pipeline offers.
As such, we deem that DUT does not reduce the architecture’s reusability and preserve its
reusability.
Reliability Reliability requires monitoring capabilities in a system to underline that the
data pipeline operates as intended with reliable data flowing for analysis. Telemetry logs
provide the means to monitor the status of the system. By using logs, one can determine
whether issues are present within the DUT. The ability to monitor the DUT allows the
assessment of whether any issues impact side-channel information being collected, and by
filtering out the parts with issues, the overall reliability of the data can be preserved. As
the data flow will not be interrupted if the DUT faces problems, our architecture provides
solutions to issues that may arise. Hence, we can claim that DUT does not reduce the
reusability of the architecture; in fact, it contributes to the reliability of the data by
introducing telemetry logs.
Scalability The DUT does not communicate with any component in the architecture
other than the Aggregator. The communication layer in between the Interceptor and the
Aggregator transfers telemetry logs to the Aggregator. As such, the number of DUT does
not affect the capability of the DUT as a component. However, with the increasing number
of DUTs, DUT ’s are limited based on the bandwidth available to the Aggregators, meaning
a single Aggregator instance can support a finite amount of DUTs. We do not provide a
definite number within our analysis as the information being transferred can change based
on the requirements for the particular task.
Interceptor
The Interceptor component consists of several sub-components to capture side-channel
information from a target DUT and manage the data acquisition systems that capture the
side-channel information. It transmits telemetry information regarding the data and the
data to the Aggregator; in essence, the data pipeline starts from the Interceptor as the
primary purpose of the pipeline is to collect side-channel information and run the machine
learning model’s analysis process.
The scenarios we listed suggest that the Interceptor component requires two changes
in total. The nature of both changes indicates that they are additive changes, meaning
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existing sub-components does not require any changes to them in such scenarios. Based
on these findings, we assess the quality attributes while considering the changes needed.
Maintainability The Interceptor’s maintainability in the pipeline is a significant factor
and a quality attribute, as the data reliability and, by extent, analysis quality depends
on the Interceptor. The Interceptor provides a surface to configure the Interceptor’s un-
derlying sub-components through an Aggregator and an Interceptor interface. Having a
configurable layer, in this case, helps users to maintain the Interceptors to fit their needs
and requirements. Thus, we can claim that the existing structure of the architecture
increases maintainability by exposing an interface to configure Interceptors. When we ex-
amine the changes, we see that Scenario REL-1 relates to the configurability of a DUT, as
the change suggests that the lack of this functionality reduces the overall maintainability
in the pipeline. The other change is coming from Scenario REL-5, which implements a
mechanism on the Interceptor to ensure data transmission happens to a healthy Aggregator
instance.
Mentioned two changes contribute towards making the architecture more maintainable.
Both changes being additive also reduces the complexity of implementing these changes.
Thus it is advisable to improve the architecture with the two changes caused by the sce-
narios.
Reusability Scenarios in Table 4.1 that require changes on the Interceptor do not affect
the system’s reusability as they are both additive changes and do not impact the data being
collected. In order to provide an analysis, we examine our structure again and provide an
assessment based on two different perspectives. The first being the Interceptor reusability
concerning capturing various side-channel sources, and the second perspective is collecting
the same side-channel source, targeting different DUTs.
When we assess the reusability of the Interceptor for different side-channel sources,
we can say that reusability depends on the channel and not the Interceptor. As described
earlier in Chapter 3, the data collector encapsulates the process of capturing a side-channel
source via a leakage probe. Therefore different side-channels can have different leak probes
and by extent data. These changes depend on the non-functional requirements of the
architecture and can change. Whereas with the second perspective, which is capturing the
same side-channel source from multiple DUTs, the data acquisition system will not differ.
Both perspectives indicate that the Interceptor meets the reusability quality attribute
without any changes to any sub-components or components, excluding the changes caused
by non-functional requirements.
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Reliability The Interceptor is responsible for side-channel data collection and works as
the primary source of data in the pipeline. Thus, the reliability of the Interceptor affects
the pipeline in full. Meaning, both data and operations will be affected in the cases where
Interceptors fail. For example, corruption of the data within the Interceptor will result in
unusable data.
The architecture design and our analysis assume the leak probe works as intended and
collects data accurately at all times. As such, we evaluate changes regarding the sub-
components of the Interceptor only. The changes due to scenarios are additive, which do
not require any breaking changes to the component and sub-components. Hence they can
be implemented without any impact on the data, which preserves the quality of the data
and the overall functionality of the Interceptor. As such, the Interceptor changes do not
affect the reliability negatively, and changes increase the reliability, albeit in a minor way.
Overall, the Interceptor is a reliable component as the changes which may affect the data
are limited based on the scenarios, and their effect on the reliability is minor.
Scalability A single Interceptor is responsible for collecting data from a single DUT and
transmitting it to a single Aggregator instance. The changes required by the scenarios do
not contribute or affect the scalability of the Interceptors. Based on our structure, we can
claim that any number of Interceptors are deployable with the limitation of Aggregator
bandwidth. As the Aggregator bandwidth is limited, a single instance of an Aggregator
will support a finite amount of Interceptor. Given the nature of high-frequency data and
high sampling in the side-channel domain, the number of Interceptors for a single Aggrega-
tor instance can quickly decrease due to the increased bandwidth usage, indicating a cost
increase that reduces the overall scalability of the pipeline and the Interceptors. Mitigat-
ing this problem and increasing scalability is possible by compressing the traffic between
an Interceptor and an Aggregator. Hence, we can say that the Interceptor component’s
scalability also relies on the Aggregator scalability. Overall, the architecture shows that
the Interceptor is a scalable component.
Analyzer
Analyzer component encapsulates vital operations within the architecture, such as analysis
and data storage. Thus, the required changes are expected to rise with the number of future
use-cases increasing. Regarding the functionality of the architecture, most of the required
functionality is met through the Analyzer sub-components. Our scenarios indicate that
there are four major changes to these sub-components of the Analyzer. When we review
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Table 4.1, scenarios from the Table cover fundamental design changes and possible additive
changes. With the majority of the sub-components that provide key functionality such as
storing data and logs being third-party, the changes regarding scenarios help us assess the
limitations of the third-party system in our context. Thus, while providing our analysis
for each quality attribute, we also underline the critical limitations around the third-party
software used within the architecture.
Maintainability The summary of changes indicates that several changes are required
for the possible scenarios that are listed. Based on the features, there are no callback
mechanisms that notify the users of failures within the pipeline, which leads to degraded
maintainability of the overall system, and critical functionalities on the Analyzer become
more prone to issues. As the Analyzer functions as the primary analysis component, it
is essential to note that the lack of flexibility around maintaining other components also
affects the Analyzer. As the reliance on third-party software is prevalent in the Analyzer,
there is a cost to maintaining the third-party software. Thus, we note that third-party tools
increase the required knowledge to maintain the Analyzer while reducing implementation
costs.
Analyzer maintainability covers large parts of the architecture maintainability, as dis-
tributed components, such as Interceptors and Aggregators, monitor the Analyzer. The
maintainability quality attribute of a system indicates the prevention of any failures through-
out the operation. Thus, in a failure, Analyzer will prevent any data from entering the
storage sub-components. We note that any maintainability factor within the pipeline ceases
to exist in the cases where the Analyzer fails to work—as such, monitoring the pipeline
provides the users with the status of the pipeline. Maintainability-wise, there are no control
mechanisms exist that do not require user input.
Our findings indicate that the Analyzer component lacks control and fail-safe mecha-
nisms that can function without user input to maintain the operations on the pipeline. For
instance, users can log in to the Analyzer and start recovering services manually. However,
this falls short as users require an alert from the logs to know the Analyzer failed.
Utilizing existing logs from components provides a vector to monitor the architecture.
Introducing the changes suggested by the scenarios and above will help control all archi-
tecture components while monitoring the Analyzer component. Based on our analysis,
changes regarding the maintainability require additive changes without any changes to the
existing structure. As such, we are implementing suggested mechanisms that will increase
the maintainability of the overall architecture.
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Reusability We consider reusability under different aspects within the system. With
requirements for users changing due to environment and costs, we first assess the reusability
of the setup, including the sub-components and changes required for them to be replaced
by other alternatives. Then we assess the reusability based on the side-channel being
collected.
Changes suggested by the scenarios in Table 4.1 shows us that the structural changes
which replace the Analyzer’s existing sub-components introduce several breaking changes,
which may span across the pipeline. In terms of breaking changes, we consider changes
that require further modifications to the pipeline, other sub-components and the interac-
tions between them as breaking changes and alterations spanning multiple components.
Hence, we can say that the Analyzer is less reusable when we replace sub-components
with non-compatible other technologies. For example, the usage of S3 Object Storage
provides necessary features compared to a traditional database. If this sub-component is
changed, modifications to the Aggregator and the Analyzer and their sub-components will
be required. Our analysis and example, SAAM show us that Analyzer sub-components
couple tightly. While the tight coupling reduces the reusability, we consider it a trade-off
to increase the reliability of these sub-components.
The other aspect we consider is the reusability of Analyzer when different side-channel
sources are being collected. The scenarios indicate that our system allows any type of side-
channel source to be collected without changes to the Analyzer except the analysis and
machine learning processes. Chapter 3 defined this condition as expected because, with
a new data representation, data will be unique, requiring further analysis on it. Thus,
Analyzer is a reusable component.
Reliability The Analyzer includes both third-party solutions and user-created solutions
as sub-components. In terms of reliability, we assume that all third-party solutions in the
architecture are reliable. Thus, we analyze the reliability based on required changes for
non-third-party solutions.
Analyzer functionality breaks into three categories: storing information and triggering
analysis with incoming data and analysis process. These functionalities are critical to the
pipeline due to the overall goal of the pipeline, which is to create outputs based on in-
coming data from Interceptors. From these categories, storing information contributes and
significantly decides the overall pipeline’s reliability and the Analyzer. Having reliability
issues for storing information leads to permanent loss of data and prevents the completing
actions under the other two categories, such as triggering the analysis or providing deci-
sions/outcomes from machine learning models or analysis models. In contrast, any failures
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occurring due to actions belonging to the other two categories are recoverable, as the data
would be available retroactively. As such, we consider information storing sub-components
to be decisive factors for the reliability of both the Analyzer and the architecture.
Using third-party software developed by large organizations and large communities
reduces reliability issues and helps free developers implement complex code bases. Another
advantage of using third-party software is that the design and architecture are often mature.
In the case of the two categories and sub-components under them, users must ensure the
pipeline’s reliability by monitoring these sub-components and ensuring their runtime occurs
without problems. When we consider the changes related to the Analyzer and our earlier
analysis concerning maintainability, we consider the monitoring capabilities of the Analyzer
to be lacking. As the pipeline reliability also ties to the monitorability as we describe, for
the system’s reliability, we consider that our architecture lacks any sub-components to
monitor the system coherently and provide any metrics that can assist. This helps assure
the reliability of the pipeline.
Scalability The description of changes shows that the Analyzer modifications have lim-
ited flexibility in the modifiability of defined sub-components. Replacing sub-components
in the Analyzer often requires breaking changes or significant changes to the Analyzer.
Unsurprisingly, these are expected as Analyzer sub-components are third-party tools, ex-
cluding machine learning and pre-processing sub-components. The primary reason for
third-party software usage is to provide out-of-the-box features that meet the require-
ments set in Section 3.1. As mentioned, third-party software reduces flexibility and adds
dependencies to the system. However, it reduces maintenance costs and increases relia-
bility, making it a viable solution for a data pipeline as reliability is often an essential
requirement. Having a reliable data pipeline also ensures that the data to be analyzed
is consistent, which reduces the time and effort spent on machine learning modelling and
analysis. Overall our architecture trades flexibility in exchange for maintainability and
reliability. It becomes a feasible solution as object storage has its architecture, involving a
major component out of the shelf, increasing our proposed architecture’s maintainability
and upgradeability. We can also conclude that additional sub-components can be added
to the architecture without requiring significant changes to the system itself.
Aggregator
The Aggregator component is responsible for gathering data from many Interceptors and
uploading them to the storage sub-components under the Analyzer, as described in Chap-
ter 3. It also acts as a way to change the configuration of Interceptors and issue commands.
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The pipeline, Aggregator receives telemetry information from DUTs, Interceptors and it-
self via the pipeline. By using this information, it is conceivable to enrich the side-channel
information from the Interceptors and provide contextual information to the data. Doing
so provides the means to any process related to the analysis to use the contextual infor-
mation to label and filter data. Hence, it contributes to the data collection and analysis,
which are major functionalities of our data pipeline. When we analyze the scenarios and
required changes in Table 4.1, we see that the changes often include additive changes to the
component, without breaking or requiring changes to the underlying sub-components while
adding new sub-components. Based on this information, we assess the quality attributes
and consider these changes to the Aggregator.
Maintainability The Aggregator component acts as a relay for side-channel information,
which is a controller for the pipeline by configuring the data acquisition system under
the Interceptor. With this approach, Aggregator provides an interface to manage the
Interceptors connected to it. When we review the required changes in Table 4.1, most
scenarios require changes that span multiple components. For instance, M-6 includes
changes to both Aggregator and the Analyzer. We consider these types of changes to
require more effort compared to the additive changes such as M-3.
Table 4.1 provides insight into which scenarios affect the maintainability directly and
which do not. Based on the scenarios and the analysis, we can conclude that the lack of
these changes hampers the user’s ability to maintain the Aggregator and other components,
potentially causing disruptions while operating the pipeline. We see that M-3 and M-6
predominantly affect the maintainability of the pipeline and the Aggregator. M-3 requires
additions to the architecture additions to architecture, whereas M-6 introduces breaking
changes which can end up altering multiple sub-components and components.
Based on the changes required to implement M-3, the architecture is missing a man-
agement interface to control all Interceptors at the same time. Users would need access to
the Aggregators to which the interceptors are connected and then use the control interface
to control the Interceptors. The required additions for the scenario suggest that a man-
agement interface must be added between the Aggregator and the Analyzer to enable the
management of Interceptors and Aggregators. The interface would also support sending
commands to any Interceptors connected to the Aggregator providing control over each
component in the pipeline. The lack of this feature reduces the maintainability as the
pipeline scales. Managing several Aggregators and Interceptors will become challenging
due to the lack of a central control system.
M-6 changes are different in nature compared to the M-3 as it includes changes that
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break sub-components of the Aggregator and other components and consider it as a major
change. Changing file systems might be a precondition for some users and may require
a change depending on the requirements. However, when we assess this change, we see
many components changing due to this change, such as the IRF sub-component. While
maintainability-wise, users may prefer other file systems, the architecture is not flexible in
the file system to provide an interchangeable structure.
Overall, maintainability wise both changes affect the architecture. Based on the anal-
ysis, we learnt that the file system of the architecture is not flexible and requires specific
systems. For this reason, we can say that from a certain perspective, which considers
swapping the file system, the maintainability of the architecture reduces. However, we do
not recommend this change with the architecture as we consider selecting a specific storage
system is justifiable and a trade-off to having a fully functioning pipeline. Controlling the
components poses a challenge, as seen in the section, and we recommend implementing
changes suggested by M-3, that can enable controlling from Analyzer directly utilizing the
Aggregator as a relay.
Reusability Aggregators, described in Chapter 3, are distributed systems in nature with
multiple instances within different or exact locations. In terms of data, no operations other
than the enrichment of side-channel data happens on the Aggregator. Changes in Table 4.1
also show that the Aggregator is a component with high reusability due to its functionality.
Some scenarios may reduce the overall reusability of the Aggregator. For instance, RES-1
may end up requiring the query system for the architecture to be fully implemented from
scratch without relying on third-party software. Overall we consider the changes relating
to the reusability in Table 4.1 as items that do not contribute to the betterment of the
reusability of the pipeline and the Aggregator.
Reliability Aggregators are critical points in the pipeline as all available information
passes through them, including but not limited to telemetry information from all the com-
ponents except the Analyzer, side-channel information and information about the pipeline.
We see through the required changes and scenarios in Table 4.1 that the Aggregator tightly
couples to the Analyzer sub-components. As the interaction defined between these sub-
components are part of third-party software in the Analyzer, the reliability of these interac-
tions relates to the overall reliability of third-party software being used. With Aggregator
being a critical part of the pipeline, we remind that fault-tolerance and redundancy would
play a massive role in improving reliability in the pipeline REL-5 requires changes, partic-
ularly in line with these recommendations. Hence, we consider the lack of changes caused
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by REL-5 to reduce the Aggregator’s reliability factors.
Scalability The Aggregator plays a vital role in scaling the system as a single Aggregator
instance accepts connections from several Interceptors, and scenarios do not negatively
affect the Aggregator’s scalability. The scalability of the Aggregator mostly relates to the
bandwidth requirements required to transfer data to the storage.
4.4 Lessons Learnt
With the analysis, we show the weaknesses and the strengths of our architecture with the
help of SAAM. Our findings indicate that the proposed pipeline and components have
improvements concerning maintainability and reliability by implementing the suggested
changes based on the analysis.
Reliability-wise analysis shows that the lack of fault-tolerance in Aggregator and Ana-
lyzer can end up in data losses, with mechanisms to provide a fail-safe pipeline fell short.
Overall the lack of fail-tolerance indicates that the architecture has reduced maintainability
and reliability. A pipeline must ensure constant operation to prevent any data loss. For
instance, critical functions such as storing data occur within the Analyzer, thus making
Analyzer capable of recovering from a failure reduces the risk of losing information for long
periods. Based on the SAAM analysis, the Aggregator is similar in terms of vulnerability
against failures just as Analyzer, indicating that Aggregator is another vulnerable part of
the data pipeline.
When analyzing Analyzer component SAAM scenarios showed that not having fail-safe
mechanisms leads to a total loss of data and prevents the pipeline from functioning. Given
the number of systems where data flows from having fail-safe mechanisms reduces the
risk of usage. Having fail-safe mechanisms improves maintainability and reliability. Thus,
the Analyzer component requires improvements to prevent any data losses with improving
changes such as REL-5.
The Aggregator component is different from the Analyzer, and the failure causes data
losses on all the Interceptors to connect to the Aggregator. As such, scenarios and their
respective changes fell short due to a lack of functionality that can recover the system
from failures and a lack of redundancy mechanisms to prevent data loss. Applying these
improvement strategies will boost maintainability and reliability with a significant impact
on reliability.
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SAAM analysis and scenarios also indicate that the components are tightly coupled with
each other, allowing little room for replacing existing sub-components on the Analyzer. As
the sub-components we use are third-party software, we consider this limitation a trade-off
to increase the reliability and robustness of the architecture. From this, we can assume
that third-party solutions may indeed reduce the flexibility of approaches to architecture.
However, we also note that the architecture has advantages with new sub-components
entering the system. The architecture we propose uses the sub-components and structures
them in an additive manner, meaning new sub-components can be added or removed
without requiring complex changes. A lesson learnt from this conclusion is that by trading
off some quality attributes, we can improve other quality attributes. In our case, we
sacrificed modifiability and flexibility with our third-party usage in exchange for increased
reliability.
Overall, SAAM provided helpful insight about possible improvements for our architec-
ture and showed the pitfalls of our design. Consequently, improving the architecture is
feasible with suggested changes in a different iteration for the architecture. As our sub-
components operate in an additive manner, implementing the proposed or required changes




The architecture provided in Chapter 3 is an abstract model with no real-world imple-
mentation to compare our findings based on our analysis in Chapter 4. The EET project
provides an example implementation of the architecture.
5.1 Overview of Project
EET is a technology that aims to protect personal computers, workstations and embedded
systems by utilizing the involuntary emissions emitted by these systems called side-channel
information. The side-channel information collection capable EET uses power consumption
data and telemetry information from a system to detect attacks on the system.
The architecture described in Chapter 3 provides and meets the requirements of the
EET with changes to the non-functional parts of the requirements. For instance, EET re-
quires a certain number of systems to be monitored at the same time to detect ransomware
within a set of systems.
EET preserves the architecture by making minor modifications to the architecture.
For example, names of the components change in the EET architecture, and the PTP
synchronization is different. The changes are albeit minor and do not impact the core
functionality. Thus EET serves as an example of the architecture.
Systems monitored by EET have a physical probe attached to them to collect side-
channel information. As EET aims to be as non-invasive as possible, leak probes do not
alter or affect the protected system. Nevertheless, the technology requires physical access
to the monitored system.
58
The technology leverages analysis processes and machine learning to identify attacks
against a system and verify the system’s integrity by analyzing ongoing activities. Feature-
wise EET draws a similar picture to IDS systems but adds new side-channel data sources.
EET requires side-channel information probes and a target device to collect data and is
independent of other protection and detection systems, which means EET can serve as a
complementary system to them.
Attack detection methods of EET rely on a series of machine learning models. EET
uses machine learning models that can train online and offline, supported by the proposed
architecture as described in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4. Machine learning model require-
ments for EET technology are similar to other detection systems. For instance IDSs and
Collaborative Intrusion Detection Systems (CIDSs) evaluate available log information and
other data sources such as network traffic data in near real-time, analyzing and identi-
fying threats live [82][83]. On the other hand, EET analyzes side-channel information
and log data, live, through a stream of information to identify and detect attacks. Thus,
time-related metrics such as CPU consumption are of importance for the EET.
The key difference between EET and other detection systems such as IDS and CIDS
is that EET utilizes logs and adds side-channel information as a data source. IDSs and
CIDSs utilize telemetry, and log information from systems to identify and analyze the
threat[84][85]. In contrast, EET utilizes not just telemetry and log information but also
utilizes side-channel information to detect attacks against a system.
Monitoring and other features such as the analysis process show similarities between
EET and other protection systems such as CIDS. CIDSs uses machine learning to detect
and alert users by callback mechanisms. EET has the same capabilities and detects attacks
on a system with machine learning and alerts users with callback mechanisms.
EET uses physical probes attached to the system to collect side-channel information.
In a real-world setting, the number of systems to be monitored and their locations may
vary. EET uses the proposed architecture to facilitate data collection in a decentralized
and scalable approach.
5.2 Functional View
EET uses the same functionality we propose in our architecture and utilizes the same
components under different names. As EET deploys to multiple networks, it also includes
changes concerning interactions between components. The terminology difference between
the proposed architecture and EET architecture is visible in the functional block diagram
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Figure 5.1. To establish a common understanding, each component within EET architec-
ture is mapped to a component in the proposed architecture.
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5.3 Deployment View
Deployment of EET generally follows the deployment shown in Figure 3.2. The deploy-
ment diagram in this section provides more details about the hardware, resources and the
environment while describing changes related to the deployment as seen in Figure 5.1.
EET is capable of detecting threats such as ransomware, malware and system modi-
fications similar to an IDS. Figure 5.2 shows the framework to enable side-channel infor-
mation collection. EET makes use of three components out of four components: these are
the EET Box, EET Aggregator Node and EET Analyzer. The EET Box interacts with
60
Figure 5.2: Deployment Diagram of EET
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the leak probe, which measures the side-channel information through the Data Collector
sub-component of the EET Box. The stream of information passes to the EET Aggregator
Node, where meta-information and logs attach to the side-channel information stream.
Inside the Analyzer component, the storage system stores the side-channel information.
The Analyzer initiates the analysis process using callback methods and uses side-channel
information, meta-information, and logs to detect attacks.
The architecture is capable of adapting to different leak probes as described in Chap-
ter 3. In EET’s case, the side-channel source is power consumption data. To capture power
consumption data, EET Box uses the sub-component, Data Collector, to interact with the
leak probe. For this purpose, the Data Collector contains several sub-components, includ-
ing an Analog-to-digital converter (ADC) and a Field-programmable gate array (FPGA).
Using these sub-components, Data Collector collects data with the help of the leak probe.
EET supports data collection at different sampling rates up to 1MS/S. Analysis of
side-channel information collected during the case study indicates that 1MS/S preserves
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data resolution where machine learning models can extract patterns. Due to different
requirements, sampling rates can increase. By updating the leak probe and the Data
Collector sub-component achieving sampling rates higher than 1MS/S is possible.
The cost of EET hardware can change due to changing requirements. For example,
sampling rate-related changes to the EET Box can cause an increase in cost per unit.
Thus, when making changes to the architecture, non-functional requirements should be
considered with cost in mind.
Figure 5.2 describes the deployment of the EET architecture without instantiating. For
example, the number of EET Boxes connected to the EET Aggregator Node is unknown. In
this case, to determine the number of units connected to the Aggregator node instance, we
use quantitative measures while adding an estimated overhead. Thus, to provide a decision
concerning the instances in an EET deployment, we use the quantitative measures listed in
Section 5.4. The measures indicate that the Aggregator must support 2 Gbps of outgoing
traffic.
5.4 Quantitative Measurements
In the case study, we deploy EET with 20 Interceptors, 1 Aggregator, and 1 Analyzer
deployed as shown in Section 5.3. We know that deploying an Interceptor with different
configurations is possible, including differing sampling rates. The side-channel data collec-
tion in the study case occurs at the sampling rate of 1MS/S. The sampling rate determines
the maximum amount of information transmitted from a single EET Box to the rest of
the pipeline. Thus, we can assess whether or not architecture scales based on sampling
rates involved. To evaluate the scaling of the EET architecture, we require quantitative
measures such as the throughput of the data pipeline.
A data pipeline consists of layers that transfer data to each other and store it. Thus, we
also need to assess our storage needs based on the targeted sampling rate. Throughout this
thesis, we have focused on providing a scalable system to collect side-channel information
by a decentralized pipeline, and SAAM suggests there are possible improvements to our
architecture concerning quality attributes we have determined in Chapter 4. By providing
quantitative measures, we compare whether SAAM offers valuable information concerning
the decentralized side-channel data pipeline.
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5.4.1 Throughput
We provide the theoretical and real throughput from a deployment of EET with 50 EET
Boxes, 1 EET Aggregator Node and 1 EET Analyzer. With the sampling rate of 1MS/S
for multiple systems. Due to the size of the information being transferred, scalability is
affected; hence, we use the throughput of the data pipeline to show that the architecture
scales to meet the required throughput of EET. By showing how the proposed architecture
manages scalability, we show a possible solution to a side-channel data pipeline that can
collect side-channel data from several systems.
We analyze the theoretical throughput of the pipeline given 50 EET Boxes connected
to an Aggregator instance to determine the scalability and hardware requirements of the
proposed system. Calculating the throughput on each component level allows users to
leverage the throughput information to determine hardware requirements with increased
precision.
Theoretical throughput calculation considers the sampling rate, size of each sample,
and network overhead. The sampling size, for instance, depends on the ADC inside the
Data Collector; as the representation supported by it is 2 bytes, the Data Collector stores
each sample as a 2-byte value. Network overhead, in our case, is the overhead in bytes
required to form UDP packets. We add 7% overhead to the total size of a single UDP
packet as overhead. Based on these assumptions, we calculate the theoretical throughput
as follows.
Sampling Rate(MS/S) Rate Per Box (Mbps/s) Rate Per Aggregator
(50 Boxes) (Mbps/s)
1 MS/S 17,12 856,00
0.5 MS/S 8,56 429,00
0.1 MS/S 1,71 85,60
0.01 MS/S 0,17 8,56
Table 5.1: Theoretical throughput of the pipeline
As shown in Table 5.1, the Aggregator node requires a minimum of two 1 Gbps network
cards working in a dual setup for 50 EET Boxes running the maximum sampling rate.
Based on the specification, the number of connected EET Boxes can reduce the cost of
the hardware requirements of the EET Aggregator. Based on the theoretical output, EET
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can use up to 50 EET Boxes with a single Aggregator instance. The Analyzer is the other
component that is affected by the throughput. The Analyzer may require a load-balancing
network with large bandwidth to handle the throughput when using the maximum sampling
rate. SAAM did not find a similar deficiency with regards to the components. Therefore, by
making changes to the architecture’s networking, the architecture’s scalability can further
be improved.
Sampling Rate(MS/S) Rate Per Box (Mbps/s) Rate Per Aggregator
(50 Boxes) (Mbps/s)
1 MS/S 16.73 836.50
0.5 MS/S 8.34 417.00
0.1 MS/S 1.71 85.50
0.01 MS/S 0.17 8.50
Table 5.2: Throughput of the pipeline based on data arriving at MinIO
With the hardware requirements based on our theoretical throughput measurement,
we can now compare our findings to a real example with the EET deployment given in
the Table 5.2. Throughput, in this case, is measured with MinIO internal monitor. The
theoretical and actual throughput is nearly identical, meaning scaling the architecture
based on the theoretical throughput is also possible. Scaling-wise, the architecture does
not fell short in any area and delivers the expected results with the specified hardware of
dual 1Gbps network cards.
5.5 SAAM vs. Reality
In the SAAM, we noted that the architecture is open to improvements in terms of reliability
and maintainability. To increase maintainability SAAM suggests adding a controller to
the Aggregator and adding an update system to the architecture. SAAM also provides
suggestions about making the architecture more reliable by introducing fail-safe methods
and redundancy. EET adopts changes for maintainability while felling short on the changes
with regards to reliability.
During the case study, problems arose regarding both maintainability during the devel-
opment of the EET. Thus, EET introduces design changes and remedies to the architecture
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with regards to maintainability. For instance, EET introduces an update system to up-
date the Interceptors. However, changes concerning reliability are lacking as some of the
issues were identified later when the pipeline was operating. For instance, the case study
shows that the data pipeline failed to operate due to the lack of safeguards within the
architecture.
EET and the architecture deploys and targets multiple systems. Thus having a method
to upgrade the software components helps increase maintainability. EET improves the
proposed architecture with sub-components under the EET Box and the EET Aggregator
Node, which are the Interceptor and the Aggregator in the proposed architecture.
SAAM findings suggest that introducing remote configuration abilities to the Aggrega-
tor will increase the maintainability. EET makes changes with regards to this suggestion
by introducing an SSH server to the architecture under the Aggregator. The SSH Server
allows establishing remote access to Aggregators, increasing the maintainability of the
Aggregator.
Reliability-wise EET does not make any changes to the structure of the architecture.
However, it uses the configuration options of the MinIO, such as hash comparing on upload.
Nonetheless, the analysis provided in Chapter 4 captures the shortcomings of the reliability
of the architecture. During the deployment of EET the pipeline failed due to the following
reasons, long recovery times due to lack of alerts based on the telemetry information
available, twice due to misconfiguration of the Aggregator software, three times due to
MinIO instance failing to access the storage attached to the Analyzer, and twice due to
Interceptor software failing without recovery caused by bugs. Thus, we can claim that
SAAM shows the shortcomings of the architecture correctly by pointing the problems
around reliability, such as the lack of fail-safe mechanisms and redundancy.
Real-world findings indicate that architecture has room to grow in terms of maintain-
ability and reliability. This finding is parallel to SAAM and the suggestions made within
Chapter 4 can successfully increase the respective quality attributes as seen with the ex-
ample of maintainability and the changes within EET concerning the maintainability.
Given the context of relatively new items in the literature such as data pipelines and
side-channel information collection, SAAM drawing a picture very similar to the real world
indicate that assessing data pipelines with SAAM yields an accurate depiction of the ca-




The thesis provides and discusses a data pipeline architecture to collect side-channel infor-
mation from a number of devices in a decentralized approach. The data pipeline consists
of four different steps. These are: (1) collecting, (2) transmitting, (3) enriching, and (4)
storing side-channel data. The architecture design consists of four major components in-
cluding the target device and referred to as Interceptor, Aggregator, Analyzer and Device
Under Test. Each major component implement parts of the four-step pipeline. We provide
a short summary of each step below.
Collecting data occurs via a side-channel leak probe, and the pipeline interacts with the
probe through the help of its components. For example, in the case study, EET collects
power consumption data.
The transmission of data happens between the components until the data gets stored
in the storage system. Interactions taking place until data gets stored is considered part
of the transmission steps. Interactions such as sending commands, control events, logs and
side-channel information fall under the transmission step.
The enrichment step provides contextual information to data. By adding meta-information
bits to the time-series data being collected, enrichment enables different techniques for
machine learning and analysis, such as using meta-information data as labels to train su-
pervised machine learning models. The architecture supports querying by the attached
meta-information to fetch data.
The storing step is responsible for saving the data for analysis, which can be triggered
based on a callback or after storing the data. In this step, the architecture offers two types
of storage: hot storage and cold storage. Hot storage refers to the storage partition with a
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demand to write, read, and modify data, often requiring high I/O. The architecture stores
incoming data for 24 hours in the hot storage and then moves the data to the cold storage.
The cold storage is built with relatively cost-effective hardware that does not support high
bandwidth I/O. Using cold storage helps preserve the dataset for potential use for 30 days
based on the requirements of the architecture.
We designed the architecture based on the four steps metioned above. Design and im-
plementation of an architecture is a subjective task, and the design can include opinionated
details. To determine whether the design and the structure captures the required func-
tionality we conducted an assessment. The analysis of an architecture involves mapping
the structure and evaluating the quality attributes of the architecture.
Assessing architectures involves structured methods that evaluate the design, imple-
mentation and structure of architecture. In this thesis, we used SAAM to assess the
architecture. The application of SAAM requires a set of quality attributes; in Chapter 4
we introduced maintainability, reliability, reusability and scalability as quality attributes
which the architecture gets evaluated against.
The results of applying SAAM showed that the architecture has shortcomings concern-
ing maintainability and reliability. Chapter 4 suggested changes to the architecture to
overcome the shortcomings of the architecture including but not limited to, implementing
an update system to the architecture.
Reliability-wise improvements to the proposed architecture include but are not limited
to redundancy and fail-over methods within the architecture. Both methods improve reli-
ability by ensuring that the risk of losing data is less compared to the architecture without
suggested changes. At the moment, EET does not implement any of the suggested ap-
proaches concerning reliability. Findings from the real-world case study with EET indicate
that SAAM provided an accurate analysis on the reliability topic by pointing to the right
shortcomings of the architecture.
Maintainability-wise SAAM describes a set of suggested improvements such as imple-
menting a controller on the Aggregator. The case study of EET follows the suggestions
and implements them in a similar way to the suggested method. For instance, instead
of adding a controller to the Aggregator, EET adds an SSH Server to the Aggregator to
connect to it remotely. Based on the issues faced during designing and implementing EET,
SAAM provides analysis parallel to the real world.
During the implementation and design phase of the case study of EET the conclusions
drawn were parallel to the results from applying SAAM. For instance lack of redundancy
and fail-safe mechanisms impact the reliability of the architecture. While implementing
EET same issues arose due to lack of these features or countermeasure, indicating that
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SAAM provided us with the same and correct points. As such our findings indicate that
SAAM is applicable to assess data pipeline architectures.
The proposed architecture has shown that it reduces the overhead of redesigning analy-
sis and machine learning components for new data by providing a reusable interface. After
analyzing SAAM and the case study, we also see that our proposed architecture applies to
other domains to enable machine learning and analysis.
The architecture provided in this thesis enables the collection of large side-channel
information datasets with a scalable and decentralized approach. Additionally adapting
the framework for another type of data source is a possibility based on the SAAM process
in Chapter 4 and a possible future work which can contribute to the literature of different
domains.
When applying SAAM, we identified the shortcomings and the advantages of the pro-
posed architecture. Scalability of the architecture and features such as the querying mecha-
nisms are advantages, whereas the lack of redundancy and control systems over the pipeline
affected maintainability and reliability of the architecture negatively. Reducing or remov-
ing these shortcomings require improvements in the architecture and Chapter 4 provides
improvement strategies and details regarding these shortcomings.
Reducing the shortcomings by implementing alternative strategies provided in Chap-
ter 4 also lays the ground work for another round of SAAM. Reapplying SAAM would
yield a comparison point between the improved version of the architecture and the pro-
posed architecture.
Data pipelines are gaining traction due to the increased connectivity of systems, assess-
ing the quality of data pipeline architectures has also become a necessity. With applications
growing in the big-data, machine-learning, and deep-learning domain, the software archi-
tectures of data pipelines, and data processing pipelines may involve more than the quality
attributes established in this thesis, expanding the analysis with quality attributes such
as deployability can provide other useful insight about the architecture. In the future,
a method can be developed to determine which quality attributes should be assessed to
analyze a data pipeline architecture. Furthermore future research can be done towards
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Fischer. Taxonomy and survey of collaborative intrusion detection. ACM Computing
Surveys (CSUR), 47(4):1–33, 2015.
[84] Hervé Debar, Marc Dacier, and Andreas Wespi. Towards a taxonomy of intrusion-
detection systems. Computer Networks, 31(8):805–822, 1999.
[85] Sandeep Bhatt, Pratyusa K. Manadhata, and Loai Zomlot. The operational role of se-
curity information and event management systems. IEEE Security Privacy, 12(5):35–
41, 2014.
76
